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Abstract
We consider the class of Bayesian environments with one-dimensional private signals
and interdependent valuations. For these environments, we fully characterize the set of
interim efficient mechanisms which satisfy interim incentive compatibility and interim
individual rationality constraints. In these mechanisms, the allocation rules assign prob-
ability one to an alternative that maximizes the sum of all agents’ virtual valuations
that are defined for these economic settings and transfer functions are defined depending
on agents’ welfare weights. This set of mechanisms is compelling since interim efficient
mechanisms are the best in the sense that there is no other incentive compatible and
individually rational mechanism that is preferred by each agent.
JEL classification numbers: C72, D44, D61
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Interim Efficient Mechanism Design with
Interdependent Valuations ∗
Serkan Kucuksenel †
1 Introduction
We study the classical Bayesian environments with one-dimensional private signals, quasi-
linear preferences, and interdependent valuations where individuals as a society have to
choose an alternative from the set of feasible alternatives and decide how to arrange side
payments to compensate all losers. Each agent obtains a private signal about his type
and an agent’s valuation for a given social alternative depends on her signal and on the
other agents’ one-dimensional signal (or information).
In these environments, a mechanism takes in the reported preferences of individuals
and in turn picks an alternative (or a probability distribution over the set alternatives)
and a vector of side transfers for every possible profile of message space. We restrict
our attention to direct mechanisms in which message space is equal to type space for
all individual. By revelation principle, there is no loss of generality in restricting our
attention to such simple mechanisms.
We are interested in characterizing interim efficient mechanisms which are the best
we can do given the incentive compatibility constraints (or strategy proofness). This
set of mechanisms are important because it specifies all possible mechanisms that we
might observe in practice and it also contains the optimal mechanism. In defining in-
terim efficient mechanisms, we use the idea of interim incentive efficiency which was first
∗The author wishes to thank John Ledyard for helpful comments. All usual disclaimers apply.
†Graduate Student, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology,
HSS 228-77, 1200 E. California Blvd., Pasadena, CA 91125, U.S.A.; serkank@hss.caltech.edu
introduced by Holmstrom and Myerson [4]. Incentive efficiency is a natural extension of
efficiency to the Bayesian environments. A mechanism is incentive efficient if it is incen-
tive compatible and there is no other incentive compatible mechanism which makes some
types of individuals better off without hurting other types of individuals. There are three
different stages to define incentive efficiency: ex ante stage, before any individual learns
his type; interim stage, each individual knows his type but not the others’ types; ex post
stage, types are common knowledge.1 In this paper, we concentrate on interim stage and
characterize interim incentive efficient mechanisms with interdependent valuations.
Our characterization is general which can be applied to different economic settings
such as nonlinear pricing by a monopolist, optimal income taxation, regulation of a
monopolist, public good provision and (multi-object either with identical objects or het-
erogenous objects) auctions by redefining the set of feasible alternatives and the set of
agents.2
Before presenting the model and results, let us discuss the relationship between our
paper and other papers in additional detail. Our analysis is closely related to Holmstrom
and Myerson [4], Cremer and McLean [1] and Ledyard and Palfrey [9], among others.
Holmstrom and Myerson [4] consider the relationship among efficiency concepts and in-
centive efficiency concepts. Cremer and McLean [1] mainly focus on methods to extract
surplus in multi-object auctions when types are correlated and they also allow for in-
terdependent valuations. They provide sufficient conditions on information structures (a
seller’s subjective probability distribution over the set of possible types of agents) under
which full surplus extraction is possible. We study a general social choice problem. In
our setup, we assume that signals are independently drawn across agents and we provide
explicit forms of the interim efficient mechanisms which also contains the optimal mech-
anism.3 Ledyard and Palfrey [9] fully characterize interim efficient allocation rules for
the class of independent linear environments with private valuations. We extend their
characterization to the class of Bayesian environments with interdependent valuations.
1See, for example, Wilson [13] and Gresik [3] for characterization of ex ante incentive efficient mech-
anisms for bilateral trade and Ledyard and Palfrey [8] for characterization of interim incentive efficient
mechanisms for public good environments. It is easy to show that the set of ex ante incentive efficient
mechanisms is a subset of the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms.
2The set of agents can be redefined by adding a seller and assigning initial property rights to the
seller.
3 The optimal mechanism can be found by equating the welfare weight of the seller to one and welfare
weights of buyers to zero in auction design.
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The present paper is a direct continuation of these papers.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we present the environment
and the basic notation. In Section 3 we reformulate the set of constraints and provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility and individual rationality.
Then, we present the characterization result and proofs. In Section 4 we study regular
problems whose solutions can be obtained by pointwise maximization and provide a
sufficient condition for regularity. We make some concluding remarks in section 5.
2 The model
There are n individual agents. The set of agents is denoted by N = {1, ..., n}. Each agent
privately observes his own type θi where each θi is independently drawn from cumulative
distribution function F i(.) on Θi = [θi, θ
i
] with 0 ≤ θi ≤ θi <∞. We assume f i(θi) > 0
for all θi. We denote a generic profile of agent valuations by θ = (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ Θ ≡ ×Ni=1Θi.
We use θ−i = (θ1, ..., θi−1, θi+1, ..., θn), and θ = (θi, θ−i) where f(θ) =
∏N
i=1 f
i(θi). Let X
be the set of possible decisions, or allocations (e.g., X could be a subset of an Euclidean
space and represent the set of possible allocations of private and public goods).
The (ex-post) utility of agent i, U i : X × Θ × R → R depends not only on her own
type, but also on the types of other agents as well. Moreover, we assume that utility
function is quasi-linear on monetary transfers.
U i(xi, θ, ti) = vi(xi, θ)− ti(θ),
where vi(xi, ., θ−i) is differentiable, monotone increasing and continuous for all i, xi, θ−i.
Let ∆(X) set of probability distribution over the set of possible allocations. A fea-
sible mechanism ζ = (y, t) consists of a probabilistic allocation rule y and a payment
function t where y : Θ→ ∆(X) is a function from agents’s reported type to a probability
distribution over allocations such that
∑
x∈X y
x(θ) = 1 and yx(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Let
Y be the set of all possible allocation rules and F ⊆ Y be the set of all feasible allocation
rules. The payment function t : Θ → RN is a map from the agents’s reported type to a
money payment by the agents where
∑N
i=1 t
i(θ) ≥ 0.4
4This condition requires that there is no outside source. Therefore a mechanism cannot run a deficit.
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In the rest of the paper we only consider direct mechanisms in which the set of
reported types is equal to the set of possible types. By the revelation principle, any
allocation rule that results from equilibrium in any mechanism is also an equilibrium
allocation rule of an incentive compatible, direct mechanism. Therefore, there is no loss
of generality in restricting our attention to these simple type of mechanisms.
Let U i(ζ, θi, si) be the interim expected utility of agent i when he reports si 6= θi,
assuming all other agents truthfully report their type. That is
U i(ζ, θi, si) =
∫
Θ−i
[∑
x∈X
yx(si, θ−i)vi(xi, θ)− ti(si, θ−i)
]
dF−i(θ−i).
Denote U i(ζ, θi) ≡ U i(ζ, θi, θi). The ex-ante utility of agent i is
U i(ζ) =
∫
Θ
[∑
x∈X
yx(θ)vi(xi, θ)− ti(θ)
]
dF i(θ).
Define also the conditional expected payment function ai : Θi → R such that
ai(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
ti(θ)dF−i(θ−i).
Following definitions which are standard in mechanism design describe our objective
function and the constraint set.
Definition 1 A mechanism ζ is interim incentive compatible if and only if U i(ζ, θi) ≥
U i(ζ, θi, si) for all i, θi, si ∈ [θi, θi].
Definition 2 A mechanism ζ satisfies interim individual rationality if and only if U i(ζ, θi)
≥ 0 for all i, θi.
Definition 3 A feasible mechanism ζ satisfies interim efficient if and only if (a) ζ is
feasible (b) ζ is interim incentive compatible (c) ζ satisfies interim individual rationality
and there is no other mechanism ζ̂ such that (a) ζ̂ is interim incentive compatible (b)
ζ̂ satisfies interim individual rationality (c) U i(ζ̂ , θi, θi) ≥ U i(ζ, θi, θi) for all i, θi and
U i(ζ̂ , θi, θi) > U i(ζ, θi, θi) for some i and for all θi ∈ Θ˜i ⊂ Θi, where Θ˜i has strictly
positive measure relative to Θi.
Interim efficient mechanisms can be represented as the solutions to a set of maximization
problems. The following well-known theorem is due to Holmstrom and Myerson [4].
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Theorem 1 A mechanism ζ is an interim efficient mechanism if and only if there exists
λ = {λi : Θi → R+}Ni=1 with
∫ θi
θi
λi(θi)dF i(θi) > 0 for some i, such that ζ maximizes∑N
i=1
∫ θi
θi
λi(θi)U i(ζ(θ), θi)dF i(θi) subject to (a) ζ is feasible (b) ζ is interim incentive
compatible (c) ζ satisfies interim individual rationality constraint.
We now proceed to characterize the complete set of interim efficient mechanisms.
3 The Characterization
It is difficult to work with the constraint set in Theorem 1. In this section, we first
start to reformulate the constraint set such that we can provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for incentive compatibility and individual rationality. The second step in
the characterization involves a general solution to the maximization problem with the
constraints rewritten as described above.
3.1 Interim Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
This constraint requires that it is a Bayesian equilibrium for each agent to report her
type truthfully. Let Si : Θi → R be agent i’s (expected) surplus function. Then given a
mechanism ζ surplus function is
Si(θi) := sup{U i(ζ, θi, si)|si ∈ Θi}.
This optimization problem determines the agent i’s optimal report. It is easy to see
that a mechanism is (interim) incentive compatible if and only if Si(θi) = U i(ζ, θi) for all
i, θi. Moreover, it is standard in mechanism design to characterize incentive compatibility
by means of an envelope and a monotonicity condition. The following result which is
useful in our characterization states that the derivative of the surplus function should be
nondecreasing and the surplus function is uniquely determined by the expected surplus of
the lowest type and the allocation rule. The proof is relatively standard, see for example
Gresik [3], and Jehiel et al. [6].
Lemma 1 A mechanism ζ is incentive compatible if and only if
(si − θi)× (Qi(si)−Qi(θi)) ≥ 0 for all si, θi ∈ Θi (1)
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Si(θi) = Si(θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)ds (2)
where
Qi(θi) ≡
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θi, θ−i)
∂vi(xi, θ)
∂θi
dF−i(θ−i).
The first condition is the standard monotonicity condition and implies that ∂S
i(θi)
∂θi
≥
0.5 The second condition is the envelope condition.6 The monotonicity condition have
implications only on allocation rules. On the other hand, the envelope condition have
implications on both allocation rules and payment functions. The above result also
implies that
ai(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θi, θ−i)vi(xi, θ)dF−i(θi)− Si(θi) for all i ∈ N,
since for all incentive compatible mechanisms Si(θi) = U i(ζ, θi) for all i, θi. Notice that
the expected payment function a is completely determined by a(θi) and the allocation
rule y since the constant of integration for all i ∈ N , Si(θi) is uniquely determined by
a(θi).
The main idea of the proof depends on showing that the following statements are
equivalent: (1) ζ is incentive compatible for buyer i; (2) Si(θi) = U i(ζ, θi) for all θi ∈ Θi;
(3) for all θi ∈ Θi, Qi(θi) ∈ ∂Si(θi). A similar result is also stated by Rochet [12] for
independent quasi-linear environments.
Now we can write agent i’s (ex-ante) expected payment in an incentive compatible
mechanism using the result above.∫
Θ
ti(θ)f(θ)dθ =
∫
Θi
ai(θi)dF (θi)
=
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)vi(xi, θ)dF (θ)−
∫
Θi
Si(θi)dF i(θi)
=
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)vi(xi, θ)dF (θ)− Si(θi)−
∫
Θi
[
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)ds]dF i(θi)
=
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)vi(xi, θ)dF (θ)− Si(θi)−
∫
Θi
Qi(s)[
∫ θi
si
dF i(θi)]ds
5 Si is convex, continuous, and monotonically increasing. This implies Si is differentiable almost
everywhere and if it is differentiable at θi then Qi(θi) = ∂Si(θi).
6See, for example, Milgrom and Segal [10].
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=∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
vi(xi, θ)− ∂v
i(xi, θ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ)− Si(θi).
Then the expected budget surplus can be written as
B(ζ) ≡
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
vi(xi, θ)− ∂v
i(xi, θ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ)−
N∑
i=1
Si(θi)
Notice that if ζ is resource feasible then B(ζ) ≥ 0 since there is no outside source.
In the next section we start to examine the implications of individual rationality
constraints.
3.2 Interim Individually Rational Mechanisms
Individual rationality requires that each type of each agent must be at least as well off
by participating as they would be by not participating at the interim stage. We assume
that outside options are exogenously given and normalized to zero. Therefore, there is no
consumption externality in our model. In other situations, it might be more appropriate
to assume that outside options are type dependent or endogenous.7
Lemma 2 An incentive compatible mechanism ζ is individually rational if and only if
for all i ∈ N , Si(θi) ≥ 0.
Proof : Individual rationality is satisfied if and only if U i(ζ, θi) ≥ 0 for all i, θi. By
incentive compatibility
U i(ζ, θi) = Si(θi) = Si(θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)ds ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N, θi ∈ Θi
That is, it requires
minθi∈Θi
[
Si(θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)ds
]
≥ 0,
⇔
7 See Krishna and Perry [7], Jehiel et al. [6], Ledyard and Palfrey [9] and Figueroa and Skreta [2] for
applications of type-dependent outside options in different economic settings.
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Si(θi) +minθi∈Θi
[∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)ds
]
≥ 0⇔ Si(θi) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N.
The other direction is trivial since vi(xi, ., θ−i) is monotone increasing.
When we combine incentive compatibility and individual rationality, we get
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
vi(xi, θ)− ∂v
i(xi, θ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ) ≥
N∑
i=1
Si(θi) ≥ 0
since Si(θi) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N from individual rationality.
3.3 Interim Efficient Mechanisms
Before stating the main characterization, the following definition and lemma will be useful
in reformulating the original problem.
Definition 4 If λ0i ≡ ∫ θi
θi
λi(θi)dF i(θi) > 0, let Λi(θi) = 1
λ0i
∫ θi
θi
λi(s)dF i(s). If λ0i = 0,
let Λi(θi) = 0.
λ0i is agent i’s ex ante welfare weight relative to other agents. Λi(θi) is a relative weight
of agent i’s lower types.
Lemma 3 ∫ θi
θi
λi(θi)
(
Si(θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)ds
)
dF i(θi)
=
λ0i
[
Si(θi) +
∫ θi
θi
(
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)Qi(θi)dF i(θi)
]
.
Proof : By changing the order of integration we get:
LHS = λ0iSi(θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)
[∫ θi
s
λi(θi)dF i(θi)
]
ds
= λ0i
[
Si(θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)(1− Λi(s))ds
]
= λ0i
[
Si(θi) +
∫ θi
θi
(
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)Qi(θi)dF i(θi)
]
.
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We can now provide a characterization for the reformulated problem. This result is much
more easier to work with than the result in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 A mechanism ζ = (y, t) is interim efficient if and only if there exists non-
negative type-dependent welfare weights, {λi}Ni=1, where
∑
i∈N λ
0i > 0, and N constants,
{ai(θi)}Ni=1, such that (y, {ai(θi)}Ni=1) solves,
maxy∈F
N∑
i=1
λ0i
[
Si(θi) +
∫ θi
θi
(
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)Qi(θi)dF i(θi)
]
(3)
subject to
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
vi(xi, θ)− ∂v
i(xi, θ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ)−
N∑
i=1
Si(θi) ≥ 0 (4)
Si(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θi, θ−i)vi(xi, θ)dF−i(θ−i)− ai(θi) ≥ 0 for all i (5)
Qi(θi) monotone increasing for all i, θi (6)
where the payment function is given by:
ai(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
ti(θ)dF−i(θ−i) = ai(θi)−
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)ds. (7)
Proof : Follows from Lemmas 1, 2, 3 and the discussion above. (4) is resource feasibility,
(5) is individual rationality, and (6) is incentive compatibility. The expected payment
function is given by
ai(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θi, θ−i)vi(xi, θ)dF−i(θi)− Si(θi)
=
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θi, θ−i)vi(xi, θ)dF−i(θi)− Si(θi)−
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)ds
= ai(θi)−
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)ds.
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4 Regular Problems
Following the same idea in Myerson [11] we characterize the solution to the problem
in Theorem 2 for the case where monotonicity constraint is not binding. In this case
solution can be obtained by pointwise maximizing the integrand in the objective function.
Then we provide conditions under which the solutions to this reduced problem satisfies
the monotonicity constraint. When the solutions to the original problem and reduced
problem coincide, we refer to problem as regular.
Given non-negative type-dependent welfare weights, {λi}Ni=1, we can define the La-
grangian function as
L(y, (ai(θi))Ni=1, γ, (µi)Ni=1) =
N∑
i=1
λ0i
[
Si(θi) +
∫ θi
θi
(
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)Qi(θi)dF i(θi)
]
+γ
[
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
vi(xi, θ)− ∂v
i(xi, θ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ)−
N∑
i=1
Si(θi)
]
+
N∑
i=1
µi
(∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θi, θ−i)vi(xi, θ)dF−i(θ−i)− ai(θi)
)
The first order conditions with respect to γ (resource feasibility multiplier) and with
respect to µi (individual rationality multiplier) imply that
γ ≥ 0, B(y) ≥ 0 and γB(y) = 0,
µi ≥ 0, Si(θi) ≥ 0 and µiSi(θi) = 0 for all i ∈ N.
The first order condition with respect to ai(θi) yields −λ0i + γ − µi = 0. Then γ ≥ λ0i
for all i ∈ N . This implies the budget surplus constraint is always binding (γ > 0) since
there is i ∈ N such that λ0i > 0 and µi  0 for all i ∈ N . Let λ = maxi∈N{λ0i}. There
are two possible cases:
Case 1: For all i ∈ N , γ > λ⇒ µi > 0⇒ Si(θi) = 0.
Case 2: For each k ∈ K, γ = λ = λ0k ⇒ µk = 0⇒ Sk(θk) ≥ 0 and for each m ∈ M ,
γ = λ > λ0m ⇒ µm > 0⇒ Sm(θm) = 0, where N = K ∪M .
The following Lemma summarizes the discussion above.
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Lemma 4
N∑
i=1
λ0iSi(θi) = λ
N∑
i=1
Si(θi)
= λ
N∑
i=1
[∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)vi(xi, θ)dF (Θ) +
∫
Θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
Qi(θi)dF i(θi)
]
.
Proof : From Case 1 and 2, if Si(θi) 6= 0 for some i ∈ N then their ex ante welfare
weights are equal to λ. The second equality follows by rearranging the terms in resource
feasibility constraint which is always binding.
Using the above result the objective function can be written as follows8
N∑
i=1
[∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
vi(xi, θ)− ∂v
i(xi, θ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ)
+
λ0i
λ
∫
Θi
(
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)Qi(θi)dF i(θi)
]
=
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
[
vi(xi, θ) +
∂vi(xi, θ)
∂θi
(
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
+
λ0i
λ
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)]
dF (θ)
Suppose we are in Case 1. In this case both constraints are binding. This implies,∑N
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X y
x(θ)
(
vi(xi, θ)− ∂vi(xi,θ)
∂θi
1−F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ) = 0 from resource feasibility and∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X y
x(θi, θ−i)vi(xi, θ)dF−i(θ−i) = ai(θi) from individual rationality. Therefore,
we can uniquely solve for the set of expected payments of all agents’ minimum types.
Suppose now we are in Case 2. The argument for each i ∈ M is similar to Case 1.
On the other hand, for each i ∈ K the individual rationality constraint is not binding.
Therefore, we need K constants to solve for the payment function. Note that the agents
with the highest ex ante welfare weight shares the surplus to make the resource constraint
binding.
When we combine both cases and rearrange terms, we get the following result. It is
much more easier to work with than Theorem 2 since we have less number of constant
to work with unless every agent has same ex ante welfare weights.
8We can divide the objective function by λ since it is exogenous.
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Theorem 3 For regular problems ζ = (y, t) is interim efficient if and only if there exist
non-negative type-dependent welfare weights, {λi}Ni=1, where
∑
i∈N λ
0i > 0, γ ≥ λ, and
K ≤ N constants, {ak(θk)|λ0k = γ = λ,∀ k ∈ K}, such that y ∈ ∆(X) simultaneously
solves the following inequalities [(8), (9), (10)];
max
y∈F
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
[
vi(xi, θ) (8)
+
∂vi(xi, θ)
∂θi
(
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
+
λ0i
γ
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)]
dF (θ)
0 ≤
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
vi(xi, θ)− ∂v
i(xi, θ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ) (9)
0 = (γ − λ)
[
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
vi(xi, θ)− ∂v
i(xi, θ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ)
]
(10)
and the payment function is given by:
∀ i ∈M, ai(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)vi(xi, θ)dF−i(θ−i)−
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)ds , (11)
∀ i ∈ K, ai(θi) = ai(θi)−
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)ds (12)
where
0 ≤
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θi, θ−i)vi(xi, θ)dF−i(θ−i)− ai(θi) ∀ i ∈ K, and
∑
i∈K
ai(θi) =
∑
i∈K
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)vi(xi, θ)dF−i(θ−i)
−
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
vi(xi, θ)− ∂v
i(xi, θ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ).
Proof : It follows from Lemma 4 and the discussion for Case 1 and 2 as stated above.
Note that
N∑
i=1
Si(θi) =
∑
i∈K
Si(θi) =
∑
i∈K
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)vi(xi, θ)dF−i(θ−i)−
∑
i∈K
ai(θi).
Then the constraint for the payment functions follows since resource feasibility constraint
is binding.
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The set of integration constants {ai(θi)Ni=1} may not be a singleton but the sum of in-
tegration constants
∑N
i=1 a
i(θi) is uniquely determined by an interim efficient allocation
rule y. Therefore, there might be different payment functions that implement the same
allocation rule (i.e., different mechanisms with a same allocation rule).
The following result is a special case of Theorem 3 in which there is only one agent
whose ex ante welfare weight is higher than the welfare weights of the other agents.
Corollary 1 Suppose the type-dependent welfare weights are such that λ0i = λ > λ0k for
all k ∈ N\{i} and γ ≥ λ. Then, for regular problems, a mechanism ζ is interim efficient
if and only if y ∈ ∆(X) simultaneously solves the following inequalities
max
y∈F
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
[
vi(xi, θ)
+
∂vi(xi, θ)
∂θi
(
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
+
λ0i
γ
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)]
dF (θ)
0 ≤
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
vi(xi, θ)− ∂v
i(xi, θ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ)
0 = (γ − λ)
[
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
vi(xi, θ)− ∂v
i(xi, θ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ)
]
where the payment function is given by:
∀ k 6= i, ak(θk) =
∫
Θ−k
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)vk(xk, θ)dF−k(θ−k)−
∫ θk
θk
Qk(s)ds ,
ai(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)vi(xi, θ)dF−i(θ−i)
−
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
vi(xi, θ)− ∂v
i(xi, θ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ)
−
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)ds.
Proof : Finding the allocation rule and the payment functions for all k 6= i directly
follows from Theorem 3. Since individual rationality constraint is binding for all −i,∑N
j=1 S
j(θj) = Si(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X y
x(θi, θ−i)vi(xi, θ)dF−i(θ−i)
− ai(θi) . We know that resource feasibility constraint is always binding. This implies
agent i receives the remaining surplus.
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4.1 Regular Problems without Individual Rationality
It is much more easier to solve the problem without individual rationality. First order
conditions imply λ0i = γ for all i ∈ N . The ex-ante welfare weights must all be equal.
Otherwise, the solution does not exist since it is always possible to improve welfare by
making arbitrarily large transfers between agents with different welfare weights. Then
the resource constraint is always binding.
Corollary 2 A mechanism ζ = (y, t) is interim efficient if and only if there exists N
constants, {ai(θi)}Ni=1, such that the allocation rule y ∈ ∆(X) solves,
max
y∈F
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
[
vi(xi, θ) +
∂vi(xi, θ)
∂θi
(
F i(θi)− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)]
dF (θ)
and the payment function is given by:
ai(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
ti(θ)dF−i(θ−i) = ai(θi)−
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)ds
where
N∑
i=1
ai(θi) =
N∑
i=1
[∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)vi(xi, θ)dF−i(θ−i)
−
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
vi(xi, θ)− ∂v
i(xi, θ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ)
]
.
Proof : The argument above implies that λ0i = γ for all i ∈ N and we know that resource
feasibility constraint is always binding. From Theorem 2, the objective function can be
written as follows
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
[
vi(xi, θ)
+
∂vi(xi, θ)
∂θi
(
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
+
λ0i
γ
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)]
dF (θ)
=
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
[
vi(xi, θ) +
∂vi(xi, θ)
∂θi
(
F i(θi)− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)]
dF (θ)
The payment function directly follows from Theorem 2 and the constraint on some of
expected payments follows from resource feasibility.
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Corollary 2 implies that if there is no interim individual rationality constraints, an in-
terim efficient mechanism can divide the surplus arbitrarily among agents as long as the
condition on the sum of expected payments is satisfied.
4.2 A Sufficient Condition for Regularity
In this section we provide a sufficient condition under which the solution to the regular
problem coincide with the solution to the original problem in Theorem 2. Let
W i(θ, x, λ0) = vi(xi, θ) +
∂vi(xi, θ)
∂θi
(
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
+
λ0i
λ
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)
. (13)
We can call W i(θ, x, λ0) as the virtual valuation of agent i for allocation x following
Myerson [11]. Substituting (13) into (8) gives us:
max
y∈F
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)W i(θ, x, λ0)dF (θ) (14)
So the regular problem to find interim efficient mechanisms can be stated as (y, t) is an
interim efficient mechanism if and only if the allocation rule y ∈ ∆(X) simultaneously
solves (14), (9), (10) and the payment function t satisfies the conditions (11) and (12).
The problem stated above has a simple solution defined by9
yx(θ, λ) =
{
1 if x = argmaxa∈X
∑N
i=1W
i(θ, a, λ0)
0 otherwise.
(15)
This implies an interim efficient mechanism assigns probability one to an allocation with
the highest sum of virtual valuations.
We now provide a condition under which the solution (15) and the condition implies
that the monotonicity constraint is satisfied. The condition is similar to the conditions
in the environments of Jehiel and Moldovanu [5] and Figueroa and Skreta [2].
Assumption 4 For all i ∈ N , all θi, si ∈ Θi, and all θ−i ∈ Θ−i such that θi ≥ si;
∂2v
i(xi, θi, θ−i) ≥ ∂2vi(yi, si, θ−i)10
9For simplicity, we assume that there are no allocations x, y, x 6= y such that ∑Ni=1W i(θ, x, λ0) =∑N
i=1W
i(θ, y, λ0). We can also use a random tie-breaking rule.
10 ∂2v
i(xi, θi, θ−i) = ∂v
i(xi,θ)
∂θi .
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where
x = argmax
a∈X
N∑
i=1
W i(θ, a, λ0) and y = argmax
a∈X
N∑
i=1
W i(si, θ−i, a, λ0).
Assumption 1 basically restricts the set of admissible valuation functions such that
interim efficient allocations rules satisfy the condition (1). It states that the derivative
of the functions vi(.) is increasing for all interim efficient allocations. Note that the
allocation is endogenous and depends on the vector of types. Let θ and s be two different
vector of types. We already know by the initial assumption that vi(xi, θ) ≥ vi(xi, s) if
θi ≥ si. However, the allocation might also change and we should guarantee that the
valuation functions of each agent is also increasing in this case.
Proposition 1 If each vi(.) satisfies the Assumption 1, then the solution (15) satisfies
all constraints in Theorem 2.
Proof : By Assumption 1, ∂2v
i(xi, θ) increases (decreases) when θi increases (decreases).
Note that the allocation of agent imight also change when the agent has a different signal.
Suppose x = argmaxa∈X
∑N
i=1W
i(θ, a, λ0), y = argmaxa∈X
∑N
i=1W
i(si, θ−i, a, λ0), and
θi ≥ si. Then,
Qi(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θi, θ−i)
∂vi(xi, θ)
∂θi
dF−i(θ−i) =
∫
Θ−i
∂vi(xi, θ)
∂θi
dF−i(θ−i)
≥ Qi(si) =
∫
Θ−i
∂vi(yi, si, θ−i)
∂si
dF−i(θ−i).
This implies Qi(θi) is monotone increasing. Hence the solution (15) satisfies all con-
straints in Theorem 2. In case si > θi the same conclusion is obtained by reversing the
inequalities.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have characterized interim efficient mechanisms for the classical Bayesian
environments with one-dimensional private signals, quasi-linear preferences, and interde-
pendent valuations. We showed that interim efficient allocation rules assigns probability
one to an allocation that maximizes sum of agents’ virtual valuations that are carefully
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defined for this environment. Moreover, we showed that the allocation rules can be im-
plemented with different payment functions as long as the sum of payments is equal to
the endogenously defined variable. We mostly concentrated on regular problems where
we assumed that monotonicity constraint is not binding and provide a sufficient condition
for regular problems. The extension of characterization to irregular problems remains
open.
The extension of our characterization to the irregular problems and to the environ-
ments with multidimensional signal with or without interdependent valuations will be a
subject of our future work.
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